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DOLAN V CITY OF TIGARD:
PROPERTY OWNERS WIN THE BATTLE
BUT MAY STILL LOSE THE WAR
Local governments increasingly require exactions' from private
property owners in exchange for permission to develop land.2 Through
these development exactions, local governments often require owners to
dedicate portions of their properties to further municipal land use goals?
Local governments justify development exactions as a means of
offsetting community burdens created by the development.4
Development exactions, however, are sometimes merely a clever means
1. Webster's Dictionary defines "exaction" as: "the act or process of exacting (or]
ExToRTION." WEBSTER'S Nnwru NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 431 (1986).
2. See Gus Bauman & William H. Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees:
A Survey of American Practices, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1987, at 51 (noting
the expanding implementation of development exactions and impact fees); James C.
Nicholas, Impact Exactions: Economic Theory, Practice, and Incidence, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1987, at 85, 88 (stating that local governments have increasingly turned
to impact exactions or impact fees as a means of financing the growing need for capital
improvements); Charles Siemon, Who Bears the Cost, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1987, at 115 (describing development exactions as a "full-blown land use 'fad"').
3. See Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, "Take' My Beach, Please!": Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional Analysis of Development
Exactions, 69 B.U. L. REV. 823 (1989). Development exactions may also take the form
of development fees which require a cash payment rather than a land dedication.
4. See Morosoff, supra note 3, at 848 ("In theory, exactions are one way for
municipalities to make private interests pay for, or subsidize, the community burdens that
their developments create.").
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for funding public benefits at the expense of a few property owners. 5
Courts have long struggled to balance the competing interests of
states and property owners.6 Although states possess considerable
authority under their police power to regulate land use,7 the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects private property
from being taken for public use without just compensation.8 With
respect to development exactions, which may take private land for public
benefit, courts must balance the impacts of the proposed land use and the
local government's requirements.9 The Supreme Court's recent decision
in Dolan v. City of Tigard0 requires exactions to be "roughly
proportional" to the impacts of a proposed development" and places the
burden of proving this "rough proportionality" on the governmental
5. Developers frequently challenge the constitutional validity of development exactions.
See Morosoff, supra note 3, at 823 (stating that developers frequently claim "that exactions
ordinances constitute takings of property without just compensation and/or deprive them
of their property without due process of law"); see also Nicholas, supra note 2, at 88
(stating that impact exactions have frequently been met with controversy and litigation);
John D. Johnston, Jr., Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for
a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 871, 873 (1967) (noting that developers contest the legality
of development exactions by claiming that "they are ultra vires, deprive the developer of
his property without due process of law, or constitute a taking of private property for
public use without compensation!).
6. The regulatory takings issue first reached the Supreme Court in Mugler v. Kansas.
123 U.S. 623 (1887). In Mugler, the Supreme Court rejected a property owner's
constitutional claim for compensation, despite the fact that a Kansas statute prohibiting the
sale of alcohol denied him all use of his property. Id. at 668-69. The Court held that the
statute was a valid exercise of the state's police power fairly adapted to a legitimate public
purpose. Id. at 662-63.
7. The Supreme Court has long recognized the authority of state and local govern-
ments to engage in land use planning. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309,
2316 (1994); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see also, Siemon, supra note 2, at 117 (noting
that land use planning by local governments is now well accepted by the Supreme Court).
8. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
9. Courts must decide whether the required exaction, in relation to the proposed
development's impacts, infringes on the property owner's constitutional rights. See, e.g.,
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 438 (Or. 1993). The issue before the court is
whether city has demonstrated the required relationship between the conditions that it
attached to its approval of petitioners' proposed land use and the expected impacts of that
land use.
10. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
11. Id. at 2319.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol48/iss1/9
DOLAN V. CITY OF TIGARD
entity requiring the exaction. 2
Part I of this Recent Development reviews the various relational
standards13 state courts have used to decide the constitutionality of
development exactions. Part II describes the facts and procedural
background of Dolan v. City of Tigard, illustrating a typical exactions
controversy. Part I discusses the Supreme Court's analysis in Dolan.
Part IV comments on the Court's new "rough proportionality" standard
and its decision to place the burden of proof on the local government.
Finally, Part V anticipates the future implications of Dolan.
I. OVERVIEW OF RELATIONAL STANDARDS
Beginning in 1922, the Supreme Court recognized that land use
regulations that require property owners to give up too much for the
public good are unconstitutional. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
14
an owner of a surface estate sued the coal company that owned the
mineral estate beneath the surface"5 for threatening to mine coal in
violation of a state regulation. 6 The coal company responded that
allowing the state statute to completely bar mining would violate the
Fifth Amendment, and the Court held that the Constitution prevented the
state from taking the coal company's property rights without
compensation. 17  The Supreme Court noted that without limits on a
state's power to regulate land use, the Fifth Amendment would become
moot.' 8 Specifically, Justice Holmes wrote: "While property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
12. Id. at 2319-20.
13. The author uses the term "relational standards" to mean: those standards that
evaluate the relationship between exactions and impacts of a proposed development The
"relational standards" must be met to avoid unconstitutionality.
14. 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922).
'15. Pennsylvania common law recognized three separate estates in mining property:
a surface estate, an estate in the minerals below, and an estate in the support of the
surface. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle,
57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561, 563 (1984).
16. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412. A Pennsylvania statute, the Kohler Act, prohibited the
mining of coal beneath another person's property in such a manner as to cause the surface
to sink. 1921 Pa. Laws 1198, § 1; see Rose, supra note 15, at 563.
17. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
18. Id. at 415.
1995]
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recognized as a taking."' 9
Despite Justice Holmes' early limitation of state police power, the
Supreme Court has offered little guidance as to when a land use
regulation "goes too far."2  For seventy years, the Court did not
address the requisite relationship between a development exaction and a
development's impacts.2 Consequently, state courts diverge widely in
the standards they use to determine the appropriate relational standard.'
Generally, state courts apply one of three standards: 1) judicial deference,
2) the "specific and uniquely attributable" test, or 3) the "reasonable
relationship" test.
Courts that apply the judicial deference standard defer to a state
legislature's determination of the appropriate relationship between
impacts and exactions. Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone Count 3
illustrates the judicial deference standard.24 In Billings, the Planning
Board for Yellowstone County rejected a developer's plans for a new
subdivision because the plans failed to dedicate land for parks and
playgrounds as required by statute.'s The developer sued, claiming that
the dedication requirement constituted a taking without compensation.26
The court determined that unless the developer could rebut the statute's
presumption of validity, the exaction requirement would stand because
the state legislature had already found a need for parks.27  The court
19. Id.
20. See E.F. Roberts, Mining with Mr. Justice Holmes, 39 VAND. L. REV. 287, 296
(1986) ("[The litmus for marking the point at which a regulation goes 'too far' has yet
to be invented.").
21. The Supreme Court's two recent decisions, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
discussed infra at notes 43-54, and Dolan v. City of Tigard, discussed infra parts II and
Im, are exceptions.
22. See infra notes 23-42 and accompanying text (discussing the various relational
standards applied by state courts).
23. 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964).
24. See Johnston, supra note 5, at 913 (noting that Billings "stands as an essay in
judicial deference to legislative judgement"); Morosoff, supra note 3, at 865 (noting that
Billings is the "leading case utilizing the judicial-deference approach').
25. Billings, 394 P.2d at 184. A Montana statute, § 11-602, subd. 9, MONT. REv.
CODE (1947), required that one-ninth of the platted area of a development be forever
dedicated to the public for parks and playgrounds. 394 P.2d at 184-85.
26. 394 P.2d at 184.
27. Id. at 188. The court had reasoned that when a development creates a specific
need, it is not an unreasonable exercise of police power to charge the developer with the
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held that the developer failed to meet its burden and deferred to the
legislature, upholding the statute as a reasonable exaction under the
police power.28
Unlike the judicial deference standard, courts applying the "specific
and uniquely attributable" standard scrutinize the relationship between
exactions and development impacts.29 The Supreme Court of Illinois
developed this standard in Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of
Mount Prospect.30  In Pioneer Trust, the Village of Mount Prospect
refused to approve a proposed subdivision plat because the developer did
not dedicate land for a school as required by local ordinance. 3' The
developer sued seeking approval of the plat without the dedication.32
The court held that the municipality could require the developer to bear
only those costs that were "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the
burdens created by the development.33  The court found that
development of the community as a whole, not the new subdivision,
created the need for additional schools.34 As a result, the court
concluded that the Village's dedication requirement was invalid.35
Many courts have adopted the "reasonable relationship" test, which
is an intermediate standard that requires local governments to
demonstrate a "reasonable relationship" between the required dedication
burden of meeting that need. Id. at 187.
28. Id. at 188. The Supreme Court of Montana stated that the legislature's determina-
tion would "not be disturbed by the judiciary unless evidence to the contrary preponderates
against it." Id.
29. See Morosoff, supra note 3, at 867 (commenting that the "specific and uniquely
attributable' test stands at the opposite end of the spectrum from the judicial-deference
test").
30. 176 N.E. 2d 799 (1ll. 1961).
31. Id. at 800-01. The Village of Mount Prospect established a land-use plan requiring
developers to dedicate one acre for public use for each sixty residential buildings
constructed or one-tenth of one acre for each acre of business or industrial buildings. Id.
32. Id. at 800.
33. Id. at 802.
34. Id. Exactions that required developers to finance needs created by the entire
community, according to the court, amounted to a confiscation in violation of the
Constitution. Id.
35. Id. The court determined that the need for new schools was not "specifically and
uniquely attributable" to the construction of the new subdivision. Id. at 802.
19951
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and a development's impacts. Simpson v. City of North Platte6
demonstrates one version of the "reasonable relationship" standard. The
Simpsons applied to the City for permission to construct a restaurant on
their undeveloped property."7 The City refused to issue a building
permit because the Simpsons failed to dedicate a forty foot roadway
easement as required by city ordinance.38 Balancing Nebraska's power
to regulate land use with the land owner's property rights,39 the court
stated that a valid exaction must have "some reasonable relationship" to
the proposed use of the property.' Because the City had no immediate
plans to construct the street and had not required adjacent property
owners to dedicate their land, the court concluded that the dedication
requirement amounted to "land banking."41  Accordingly, the court
concluded that the exaction exceeded the City's power to regulate land
use.
4 2
State courts' conflicting tests created a need for the United States
Supreme Court to develop a uniform relational standard. In Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission,43 the Supreme Court set the stage to
select a relational standard in Dolan v. City of Tigard.' The Nollans
owned property between two public beaches in Ventura County,
California. 45 They decided to replace the dilapidated bungalow on their
property with a new house and applied to the California Coastal
36. 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980).
37. Id. at 299.
38. Id. at 299-300. North Platte City Ordinance No. 1962 provided that no building
shall be erected on any lot unless half of the street adjacent to the lot had been dedicated
in compliance with the City's comprehensive land use plan. Id. at 299.
39. The Nebraska Constitution contains a taking clause nearly identical to that of the
United States. Id. at 300 (citing NEB. CONST. art. I, § 21).
40. Simpson, 292 N.W.2d at 301. The court noted that if a development exaction is
merely an excuse for taking property when the landowner requests a permit, such a
requirement is an improper exercise of eminent domain. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 302.
43. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
44. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); see Morosoff, supra note 3, at 852 ("Nollan represents the
Supreme Court's first encounter with the constitutionality of development exactions.").
45. 483 U.S. at 827. Faria County Park, an oceanside public park with a public beach
lay a quarter-mile north of the Nollans' property. Id. Another public beach, locally
known as "the Cove," lay 1,800 feet to the south. Id.
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Commission for a development permit.' The Commission conditioned
its approval on the Nollans granting public access across their property
to facilitate travel between the two public beaches.47 The Commission
claimed that the Nollans' proposed house would reduce the public's view
of the beach and erect a psychological barrier to public use of the beach
while increasing private use.48 The Nollans challenged the access
requirement, claiming that it violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 9
The Supreme Court held that an "essential nexus" must exist
between the exaction and a legitimate state interest." The Court found
it "quite impossible" to understand how requiring the Nollans to allow
the public to walk across their property reduced the viewing obstacle
created by their new house.5 Because the Court found no sufficient
nexus between the access condition and a legitimate state interest,52 the
Court concluded that the access requirement was unconstitutional. 3
The Court recognized that if a court finds a nexus, it must then analyze
the "fit" between the exaction and the impacts of the proposed
development.' The Court, however, did not define the parameters of
that "fit."
46. Id. at 827-28.
47. Id.
48. Id. The Nollans' property extended seaward only to the mean high tide line. Id.
at 828. Accordingly, that portion of the beach lying below the mean high tide line was
public.
49. Id. The Nollans sought judicial redress from the Commission's decision, claiming
that the access condition bore no reasonable relationship to any burden created by the
proposed development and thus constituted a taking of private property without
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
50. Id. at 837. The Supreme Court reversed the California Court of Appeal, which had
found that "only an indirect relationship" need exist between an exaction and a proposed
development. Id. at 830. The California Court of Appeal concluded that a sufficient
relationship existed between the required access condition and the burden created by the
Nollans' proposed development. Id. at 830. Therefore, the California court found no
constitutional obstacle to the Commission's access requirement. Id. at 830-31.
51. Id. at 838.
52. The Court impliedly recognized preserving the view of the beach as a legitimate
state interest, but failed to see how the access condition related to that interest. Id.; see
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994) (noting that, in Nollan, the Court
had found visual access to the ocean to be a legitimate public interest).
53. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839.
54. Id. at 838.
1995]
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II. BACKGROUND: DOLAN V CITY OF TIGARD
The City of Tigard, Oregon, pursuant to state law and state land use
goals, adopted a comprehensive land use plan.55 To implement its plan,
the City revised its zoning ordinance.56 The revised ordinance required
a dedication of land for greenways and pedestrian-bicycle pathways
whenever someone developed adjacent to a flood plain. The City's
plan contained no provisions to compensate owners for the loss of their
property.5"
John and Florence Dolan 9 owned a hardware store in the City of
Tigard.60 Fanno Creek, a small stream, ran along the back of the
Dolans' property.61 To keep up with competition, the Dolans decided to
expand their small business. 62  Specifically, the Dolans planned to
increase the size of their store and pave a new parking lot.63 The
Dolans applied to the City for the required building permit.' The City
55. That plan provided that the City would develop policies to retain a vegetative
buffer along streams and other drainageways, to reduce flood damage and provide erosion
control. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (No. 93-
518). Furthermore, the plan required the City to review each development request in areas
proposed for pedestrian-bicycle paths to determine the necessary easements or dedications.
Id. at 6.
56. Id. at 6. The zoning ordinance is Title 18 of the City of Tigard's Community
Development Code. Id.
57. Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Dolan (No. 93-518).
58. Id. at 5.
59. Mr. Dolan died prior to the Supreme Court hearing the case. Id. at ii. As a result,
the Supreme Court case was brought solely by Mrs. Dolan.
60. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2313 (1994). Tigard, Oregon has a
population of 18,364 and is located just southwest of Portland, Oregon. RAND MCNALLY
ROAD ATLAS (1991).
61. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313.
62. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Dolan (No. 93-518).
63. Id.
64. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313.
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approved the Dolans' proposal on two conditions.6 First, the City
required the Dolans to dedicate all of their land within the creek's 100-
year floodplain for a public greenway.' Second, the City required that
the Dolans dedicate a fifteen-foot wide strip of land adjacent to the
floodplain as a pedestrian-bicycle path. 7
The Dolans appealed the City's decision to the Oregon Land Use
Board of Appeals (LUBA)." The Dolans argued that the City's
dedication requirements were not sufficiently related to their expansion
plans, and therefore constituted an uncompensated taking in violation of
the Fifth Amendment." The City claimed that the Dolans' expansion
would increase storm water runoff ° and vehicle congestion 7' and that
these adverse impacts justified the dedication requirements.'
Specifically, the City argued that the proposed greenway would facilitate
65. Id. at 2314. In addition to the two requirements discussed infra, the City Planning
Commission originally required that the Dolans: 1) pay a $14,256.02 traffic impact fee,
2) calculate the actual increase in surface water runoff due to the development and pay a
"fee in-lieu of water quality" to mitigate the effects of that runoff, and 3) relocate the
"footprint" of their proposed new store. Brief for Petitioner at 8 n.2, Dolan (No. 93-518).
However, these requirements were not the focus of the Dolans' judicial appeals.
66. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314. The purpose of the greenway dedication requirement
was to promote flood control on Fanno Creek. Id.
67. Id. The City required approximately 7,000 square feet of the Dolans' land, about
10% of their property. Id.
68. LUBA has exclusive jurisdiction over local government land use decisions and it
is the first body to review them. ORE. Rnv. STAT. § 197.825(1) (1991). Brief for
Respondent at 3 n.5, Dolan (No. 93-518).
The Dolans had previously challenged the City's exactions in the Oregon LUBA as
violating the Federal Constitution. Brief for Petitioner at 7 n.1, Dolan (Nol. 93-518).
LUBA denied the appeal, holding that the claim was not ripe because the Dolans failed
to ask the City for a variance. Id. Subsequently, the Dolans applied to the City for a
variance from the zoning regulations. Id. When the City denied their variance application,
the Dolans appealed to LUBA again. Id. That appeal is the one discussed in the text.
69. Brief for Petitioner at 9 n.3, Dolan (No. 93-518).
70. Brief for Respondent at 14, Dolan (No. 93-518). The City maintained that the
Dolmans' plans to enlarge their paved parking area would increase the "impervious surface"
of the property and thereby increase the storm water flow into Fanno Creek. Id.
71. Id. at 17. The City argued that by increasing the size of their store the Dolans
would attract more customers, thereby increasing traffic congestion in the area. Id. at 18.
Coincidentally, the pathway dedication also advanced the City's plans to develop a
continuous pathway.
72. Brief for Respondent at 14, Dolan (No. 93-518).
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flood control efforts on Fanno Creek73 and that the bike path would
offset increased traffic demands.74 LUBA upheld the City's dedication
requirements, finding a "reasonable relationship" between the Dolans'
plans and the City's exactions. 5
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed LUBA's decision.76  The
court combined the tests the City and the Dolans77 proposed and
determined that for an exaction to be '"reasonably related' to an impact,
it is essential to show a nexus between the two .... ,, Applying this
test, the court concluded that the City's conditional dedication
requirements did not violate the Constitution.79
73. Id. at 17.
74. Id. at 18.
75. 22 Or. LUBA 617 (1992). The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the LUBA
decision. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). The court rejected
the Dolan's contention that in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987),
the Supreme Court of the United States had abandoned the "reasonable relationship" test
in favor of a stricter "essential nexus" standard. 832 P.2d at 854-55.
76. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993).
77. The City argued that it need only show a "reasonable relationship" between the
development's impact and the required exaction. Dolan, 854 P.2d at 441-42. The Dolans,
relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987), argued that the City must demonstrate an "essential nexus" between a
legitimate state interest and the condition required by the regulating authority. Dolan, 854
P.2d at 441; see supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text (discussing Nollan).
78. Dolan, 854 P.2d at 443.
79. Dolan, 854 P.2d at 444. The dissent weighed the relationship between the City's
conditional exaction and the proposed development's impact more closely than the
majority. Id. at 444-49 (Peterson, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that if an exaction is
only an excuse for what is in fact a taking, the exaction is unconstitutional, even if some
relationship exists between the development's impacts and the required exaction. Id. at
444. The dissent concluded that the City failed to meet its burden of establishing that the
proposed development's burdens required the dedication of the Dolan's property. Id. at
449.
Importantly, both the majority and the dissent placed the burden of proving the
necessary relationship on the City. Id. at 444; see supra note 9 and accompanying text
(noting that the majority specifically framed the issue in a manner that placed this burden
of proof on the City). The majority framed the issue as: "whether city has demonstrated
the required relationship between the conditions that it attached to its approval of [the
Dolan's] proposed land use and the expected impacts of that land use." Dolan, 854 P.2d
at 438 (emphasis added).
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. "ROUGHLY PROPORTIONAL": THE SUPREME COURT'S
ANALYsIs IN DoLAN
The Supreme Court weighed the competing interests of the state and
the individual in Dolan v. City of Tigard.s0 The Court recognized that
the purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent government from forcing
some individuals to bear public burdens which, in fairness, "should be
borne by the public as a whole."' The Court, however, also recognized
the social necessity of allowing local governments to engage in land use
planning.' Balancing these competing interests, the Court concluded
that development exactions are valid if they are related in nature and
extent to the impacts of the proposed development.83
To determine the proper relational test, the Court looked to the
standards applied by state courts." The Court criticized the judicial
deference standard' because it failed to offer sufficient protection to an
owner whose property was taken for a public purpose.8 6 Likewise, the
Court rejected the "specific and uniquely attributable" test, 7 asserting
80. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
81. Id. at 2316 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
82. Dolan, 114 S. CL at 2316. The Court noted that if the City had simply required
the Dolans to dedicate their land along Fanno Creek for public use, rather than
conditioning its approval of a permit on the dedication, an unconstitutional taking clearly
would have occurred. Id.
83. Id. at 2318. Prior to its analysis of the necessary relationship between the exaction
condition and the impact of the proposed development, the Court concluded that a nexus
existed between the City's legitimate interest of preventing flooding along Fanno Creek
and limiting development within the creek's 100-year floodplain. Id. Similarly, the Court
concluded that the pedestrian-bicycle path might further the City's legitimate interest of
relieving traffic congestion. Id. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text (discussing
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n and the "essential nexus" requirement). In Nollan,
the Court did not need to address the necessary degree of relationship between impacts and
exactions, because the required exaction lacked any nexus with the state's interest in
preserving visual access to the beach and therefore was unconstitutional. Nollan, 483 U.S.
at 838.
84. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318-19.
85. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial deference
standard).
86. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
87. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text (discussing the "specific and
uniquely attributable" standard).
1995]
Washington University Open Scholarship
286 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 48:275
that the Constitution does not require such exacting scrutiny.88 The
Court noted that a majority of state courts have adopted some form of
the "reasonable relationship" test, and that this test best approximated the
relationship required by the Constitution.89 The Court fashioned the
term "rough proportionality" to better describe the necessary relationship
between exactions and a development's impacts.90
Having determined the applicable standard, the Supreme Court
evaluated the relationship between the City of Tigard's exaction and the
development's impacts.9 The Court questioned why a public greenway,
easement was necessary to mitigate flooding on Fanno Creek.'2
Furthermore, the Court faulted the City for not quantifying the extent to
which the pedestrian-bicycle pathway would decrease traffic
congestion.93 The Court also recognized Mrs. Dolan's constitutionally-
based right to exclude others from her property.94 Concluding that the
City had failed to prove that the pathway easement was sufficiently
related to any prospective increase in traffic,9' the Court held that the
City failed to demonstrate a reasonable relationship96 between the
88. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
89. Id. at 2319. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text (discussing the
"reasonable relationship" standard).
90. 114 S. Ct. at 2319. The Court explained its choice of the term "rough
proportionality" by noting that "reasonable relationship" seemed confusingly similar to the
term "rational basis" which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Court stressed that "[no precise
mathematical calculation' was required. Id. However, the local government must make
"some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development." Id. at 2319-20.
91. Id. at 2320.
92. Id. The Court recognized that keeping the greenway free of development would
limit the pressures on Fanno Creek; however, the Court went on to suggest that a private
greenway would serve the City's interest in flood control just as well as a public
greenway. Id.
93. Id. at 2321. The City found only that building the pathway could offset some of
the increase in traffic congestion. Id.
94. Id. at 2320.
95. Id. at 2322. In its final paragraph, the majority commended the City's goals of
controlling flooding and traffic congestion, but recognized that there are constitutional
limits to the methods of accomplishing them. Id.
96. After supposedly replacing the "reasonable relationship" standard with the term
"rough proportionality" because it better "encapsulates ... the requirement of the Fifth
Amendment.... .", 114 S. Ct. at 2319, the Court failed to mention "rough proportionality"
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required floodplain easement and the impacts of Mrs. Dolan's expansion
plans.9
7
The dissent criticized the majority for not considering that the
Dolans would receive some benefits from the City's proposed drainage
plan." Only when a property owner demonstrates that an exaction is
"grossly disproportionate" to the proposed development's adverse effects,
the dissent argued, should courts consider whether the City harbors
motives other than land use regulation. 9  Furthermore, the dissent
disagreed that the City should bear the burden of proving the necessary
relationships."° Instead, the dissent asserted that the party challenging
the state action should demonstrate that the exaction unreasonably
exceeds the value of a proposed development.'"
IV. ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY
A. "Rough Proportionality"
The Supreme Court's new "rough proportionality" standard
represents an equitable balance between the constitutional rights of
property owners and the states' power to regulate land use. The
anywhere else in its opinion. Rather, the Court concluded that the City's exaction
requirements did not bear "the required reasonable relationship" to the impacts of Mrs.
Dolan's proposed development. Id. at 2321.
97. Id. at 2321. The Court noted that it was difficult to see how allowing the public
to trample along Mrs. Dolan's floodplain was sufficiently related to the City's legitimate
interest in flood control. Id. at 2320.
98. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2324 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that
the City's drainage plan to increase Fanno Creek's carrying capacity would offer
significant benefits to adjacent landowners, including Mrs. Dolan. Id. The dissent further
argued that a proper analysis should focus on the impact of the City's action on the entire
parcel of the Dolan's property, rather than just the portion required for dedication. Id.
99. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2325 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2326. The dissent argued that a "strong presumption of validity should
attach" to any conditions placed on a permit in furtherance of a valid land use plan. Id.
at 2329-30.
101. Id. at 2330.
102. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1250 (1967)
(commenting that the proper standard for evaluating compensation claims is a "workable,
impersonal rule believed to approximate in a useful proportion of cases the same result that
fkirness would dictate").
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Constitution's Framers,"0 3 the Supreme Court,' and scholars"o5
agree that fairness lies at the heart of the Takings Clause. Fairness
requires that the public should not be saddled with the adverse impacts
created by those who develop their private property.'"s Fairness,
however, also dictates that private pi:operty owners should not be forced
to pay for civic projects benefiting the entire community. By requiring
a "rough proportionality" between exactions and a development's
impacts, the Supreme Court recognized that neither property owners nor
the community should bear burdens more appropriately shouldered by the
other.
The Court properly rejected the "judicial deference" standard.'
This approach allows state legislatures, rather than courts, to determine
the proper balance between a state's power to regulate land use and the
rights of property owners.108 Allowing state legislatures to determine
the limits of their own power jeopardizes the protection afforded by the
Fifth Amendment."° When faced with a choice, states may choose to
103. The framers thought it unfair that government could require individual property
owners to dedicate their land for the benefit of the public as a whole. See Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) ("The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.") (emphasis added).
104. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (citing, with approval, Armstrong
v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
105. See Michelman, supra note 102, at 1171-72 (suggesting the basis for evaluating
claims for compensation under the Takings Clause should be one of fairness); Roberts,
supra note 20, at 293, 301 (noting that the issue is one of fairness); Siemon, supra note
2, at 120 (noting that a concept of fundamental fairness has shaped modem land use
controls); Morosoff, supra note 3, at 840 ("Several scholars have argued that the basic
concept behind the whole takings issue is one of fairness.").
106. See Nicholas, supra note 2, at 99 (asserting that "taxpayers should not be
expected to subsidize new development').
107. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (discussing judicial deference
analysis).
108. See Morosoff, supra note 3, at 866 (commenting that the judicial deference
standard leaves the determination of the necessary relationship to the very municipality that
is imposing the exactions).
109. See Roberts, supra note 20, at 301 ("[T]he real problem ... is whether state
governments can be trusted to decide fairly whether the taxpaying public at large or private
property owners ought to bear the cost of progress.'); Siemon, supra note 2, at 124 (noting
that exaction ordinances provide the potential for abuse and disparate treatment); Morosoff,
supra note 3, at 839-40 (illustrating, by example, how states might use their police power
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avoid paying compensation by taking property through an exercise of
their police power rather than by eminent domain." 0
The Court also properly rejected the "specific and uniquely
attributable" standard because it is too rigid."' Exactions offer local
governments an alternative to an outright development ban by allowing
development to proceed while offering the municipality a mechanism for
mitigating the project's adverse impacts."2 Requiring local
governments to demonstrate such a strict relationship between impacts
and exactions takes away needed flexibility.
Finally, the "reasonable relationship" standard's nebulous language
does not promote uniformity among courts." 3 Without a more exact
proportionality standard, state courts would be free to choose whatever
to avoid paying compensation).
110. See Roberts, supra note 20, at 291 (arguing that absent a firm takings doctrine,
"the public... always will resort to the police power in lieu of the eminent domain power
and the institution of private property itself will be in jeopardy"); see also Pioneer Trust
& Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Il. 1961)
(recognizing the natural tendency of states to extend their police power to avoid the
compensation requirements of the Fifth Amendment).
111. See, e.g., Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447 (Wis.
1965) ("In most cases it would be impossible for the municipality to prove that the land
required to be dedicated for a park or school site was to meet a need solely and [uniquely]
attributable to the [development of a new subdivision].'), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4
(1966). See Johnston, supra note 5, at 914 (noting that "specifically and uniquely
attributable" standard presents an "almost unattainable standard of validity"); see also
supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text (discussing the "specific and uniquely
attributable" standard).
112. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2322 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that
development exactions offer property owners an opportunity to develop when the local
government could outright ban the development because of its adverse impacts); Morosoff,
sura note 3, at 851 (noting that development exactions permit development by requiring
developers to make a contribution to cancel out their projects' undesirable consequences);
iee also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 847 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the benefits of
allowing states the flexibility to balance private and public interests by using exactions as
a means of offsetting burdens created by development).
113. See generally John J. Delaney et al., The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test
for Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs., Winter 1987, at 139, 156 (concluding that the reasonable relationship test is a
vague standard). As an illustration, the Oregon Supreme Court found that the exactions
required by the City of Tigard were "reasonably related" to the impact of the proposed
development. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437,434-44 (1993). The Supreme Court
disagred. 114S. Ct. at 2321. The more precise "rough proportionality" standard attempts
to remove that incongruity.
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degree of relationship they considered appropriate." 4 Some courts
might interpret the standard as requiring only the most tenuous
relationship between impacts and exactions.' Other courts might
require a much stricter relationship. Because of its vagueness, the
"reasonable relationship" standard is too unpredictable.
The Court's decision in Dolan properly balances a state's power to
regulate land use and an individual's property rights. The decision also
may be viewed as increasing the level of judicial scrutiny focused on
development exaction schemes. The Court adopted the "rough
proportionality" standard instead of the widely-used "reasonable
relationship" standard because the Court was concerned with the proper
level of judicial scrutiny."6  Dolan requires courts to scrutinize the
relationship between required exactions and the adverse impacts of
proposed developments. Such scrutiny is particularly appropriate when
the local government has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the
decision." 7
B. The Burden of Proof
Few will dispute the fairness of the Court's requirement that
exactions bear a "rough proportionality" to a development's impacts." 8
On the other hand, placing the burden on local governments to prove that
114. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the
Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause" applicable to the states). As the City noted in its
brief, ultimately, "the significance of any test depends less on its precise wording than on
how courts apply it in practice." Brief for Respondent at 31 n.25, Dolan (No. 93-518).
115. The Oregon Supreme Court's cursory investigation into the relationship between
the City of Tigard's exaction requirements and the impacts of the Dolans' proposed
development demonstrates that the "reasonable relationship" standard may offer the
property owner little protection in some jurisdictions. Dolan, 854 P.2d 443-44; see also
Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So.2d 863, 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(noting that the reasonable relationship test gives local governments "almost unlimited
discretion"), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 955 (1977).
116. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319. The dissent also recognized that the Court's decision
represents a heightened level of scrutiny. Id. at 2329 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. If the local government is allowed to "take" the property under its police power,
it is not required to pay compensation. See generally Siemon, supra note 2 (arguing for
strict judicial review of local impact exaction requirements).
118. Even Richard Lazarus, author of the brief for the City of Tigard, commented after
the case that the "rough proportionality test in isolation is perfectly fair." Linda
Greenhouse, High Court, in a 5-4 Split, Limits Public Power on Private Property, N.Y.
TIMES June 25, 1994, at 1.
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relationship will undoubtedly foster disagreement. The burden of proof
issue split the Court in Dolan.19 The majority placed the burden on
the City to prove a "rough proportionality" between its dedication
requirements and the impacts of the proposed development. 2 ° The
dissent disagreed, charging that the Court "stumbled badly" by
abandoning the traditional presumption of constitutionality given to state
statutes.1
2 1
The disagreement results largely from a difference in perspective.
In its brief, the City of Tigard classified the exaction requirement as a
legislative action.' The City argued that, under a long line of
precedent, state laws are entitled to a presumption of validity."
Accordingly, the City claimed that the party challenging the
constitutionality of an exaction requirement bears the burden of proving
its invalidity. 24 In contrast, the Supreme Court viewed the exaction
requirement as an adjudicative determination rather than a legislative
enactment."z  As a result, the Court determined that the exaction
requirement was not entitled to a presumption of validity. 26
The majority's position on the burden of proof issue is consistent
with its analysis of the relational standard issue. The Court required
local governments to make an "individualized determination" concerning
whether an exaction is related to the impact of the proposed development
in -both nature and extent. 27  Such determinations more closely
resemble adjudications than legislative acts. Accordingly, the Court
rejected the presumption of validity which traditionally accompanies
119. See supra part Il (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis in Dolan).
120. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
121. Id. at 2330 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Brief for Respondent at 24, Dolan (No. 93-518).
123. Id.
124. Id. On the other hand, Mrs. Dolan cited little authority to support her argument
that the burden should be place on the City. She primarily relied on Justice Brennan's
dissent in Nolan v. California Coastal Comm 'n, for the proposition that Nollan shifted the
burden of proof to the state. Petitioner's Reply to Brief for Respondent at 12, Dolan (No.
93-514) (citing Nollan, 483 U.S., at 841 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
125. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320 n.8.
126. Id.
127. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321. Presumably state statutes that require flat percentage
exactions (10% of a developer's property, for example) would be unconstitutional in light
of Dolan, because they require no "individualized determination.'
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legislative acts because adjudicative decisions are not presumed valid.
Placing the burden of proof on the local government accords with the
opinions of most state courts, which have placed the burden of proof on
the government entity requiring the exaction.'
Moreover, the Court's approach to the burden of proof issue is
reasonable. The party bearing the burden of proof in an exactions case
faces a difficult task,129 particularly when the impacts of a proposed
development relate to the environment.13 Nevertheless, the language
of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous - "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation."' 3'
Therefore, once a property owner "proves" her property has been taken
without compensation, it is reasonable to require the State to demonstrate
why compensation should not be paid.
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Is Dolan v. City of Tigard, as Justice Stevens commented,
"unquestionably an important case?"' 32  Some consider Dolan an
128. Despite the dissent's comments to the contrary, the majority's placement of the
burden on the local government is not "novel." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2326 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens criticized the majority for "imposing a novel burden of proof
on [the] city...." Id. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 444 (Or. 1993)
(Peterson, J., dissenting) (noting that both the majority and dissent place the burden on the
City to prove that the exaction serve a legitimate state purpose and that the exaction
possessed the necessary relationship to the impact of the proposed development); Simpson
v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Neb. 1980) (stating that there was
insufficient evidence on the record to find for the municipality); Jordan v. Village of
Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442,447 (Wis. 1965) (stating that in order for an exaction
to be valid the municipality must provide enough evidence to show that the needs
addressed result from the development); Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of
Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (II. 1961) (suggesting that the municipality failed
to establish that the exaction requirement met the relevant relational standard).
129. See Johnston, supra note 5, at 914 (commenting that the burden of establishing
the necessary relationship between exactions and a development's impacts are substantial).
130. See Greenhouse, supra note 118, at 1 (quoting Richard Lazarus, author of the
brief for the City of Tigard, who commented that it is very hard to quantify risks like
increased flooding and traffic congestion). Recognizing this difficulty, the Court lessened
the local government's burden by emphasizing that precise mathematical calculations are
not required. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
131. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
132. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2322 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the "mountain
of briefs" received by the Court indicated that much more was riding on the Dolan
decision than the sixth of an acre lying behind Mrs. Dolan's hardware store).
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important victory for property owners."' A closer look, however,
suggests that the case affords less than perfect protection against
excessive development exactions. First, local governments and property
owners recognize that appealing exaction requirements to the courts is
time consuming and expensive. This burden gives local governments
considerable leverage."I Unless a dedication requirement is
extraordinarily onerous, developers may choose to comply rather than
suffer the delays, costs, and risks of judicial review.'35
Moreover, Dolan's language may allow local governments to
circumvent its holding by recharacterizing their exaction conditions.
Specifically, the Supreme Court distinguished the exaction in Dolan from
those that are "essentially legislative determinations" and those
regulations that are "simply... limitation[s] on... use."'36 It is also
unclear whether Dolan's rough proportionality and burden of proof
requirements apply to impact fees, as well as dedication
requirements.
37
Lastly, a review of recent state court opinions suggests that lower
courts may overlook or avoid Dolan's requirements. 31 While some
133. See Dolan, 114 S. CL at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting that
"property owners have surely found a new fiend"); Greenhouse, supra note 118, at 6
(describing Dolan as a considerable victory for property owners).
134. See Richard F. Babcock, Foreword, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Winter 1987, at
1, 2 (noting that because it costs "tens if not hundreds of thousands of dollars" and takes
"three to four years" to get a judicial resolution regarding the validity of exaction
requirements, the local government has considerable municipal leverage).
135. See Siemon, supra note 2, at 125 (noting that because litigating an impact
exaction requirement costs thousands of dollars and takes up to a year, developers have
no choice but to comply with the local government's requirement). But cf CAL. Civ.
Pioc. CODE § 1036 (West 1980) (allowing reimbursement of a property owner's
reasonable costs and attorney's fees if the owner establishes that the restriction on use is
a compensable taking).
136. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316. In a footnote, the majority agreed with the dissent
that "in evaluating most generally applicable zoning regulations, the burden properly rests
on the party challenging the regulation to prove that it constitutes an arbitrary regulation
of property rights." Id. at 2320 n.8.
137. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994) (vacating and
remanding Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1737 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), in
light of Dolan). The Supreme Court's disposition of this case suggests that Dolan may
apply to development fees.
138. See, e.g., Luxembourg Group, Inc. v. Snohomish County, No. 33263-5-I, 1995
WL 4713 (Wash. CL App. Jan. 9, 1995) (finding unconstitutional a right-of-way exaction,
but not reaching the Dolan balancing); J.C. Reves Corp. v. Clackamas County, LUBA No.
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courts hold for the land owner,'39 others either persist in their old ways
or attempt to avoid Dolan. In Trimen Development Co. v. King
County,"4° for example, the Supreme Court of Washington upheld a
county ordinance that conditioned plat approval on the payment of park
development fees. 14 ' Failing to apply Dolan's "rough proportionality"
test, the Washington Supreme Court determined that the park
development fee was "reasonably necessary' ' 42 as a result of the
proposed development.
43
Similarly, in Home Builders Association of Central Arizona v. City
of Scottsdale,'44 an Arizona court failed to apply Dolan's "rough
proportionality" test.145 Instead, the court stated that a development fee
94-027, 1994 WL 700690 (Or. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1994) (upholding, without detailed
factual findings, an access condition); Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,
490 S.E.2d 200, 202 n.3 (Ga. 1994) (declining to apply Dolan to a city ordinance requiring
conditions of all parking lots); Spring v. New Caanan Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No.
CV 135583, 1994 WL 669205 at *5 n.2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 1994) (dismissing in
a footnote, the land owner's Dolan claim because the commission "was acting in a
legislative capacity"). But see Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 884 P.2d 569 (Or. Ct. App.
1994) (applying Dolan to invalidate a development exaction); Trimen Development Co.
v. King County, 887 P.2d 187 (Wash. 1994) (en banc); Home Builders Ass'n of Central
Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 875 P.2d 1310 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); R.R Hensler v. City of
Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043 (Cal. 1994) (en bane).
139. See, e.g., Schultz, 884 P.2d 569.
140. 877 P.2d 187 (Wash. 1994) (en bane).
141. Id. King County Code § 19.38.020 states, in part, that plat approval "shall be
contingent upon reservation or dedication of land for the open space and recreational needs
of its residents or payment of a fee-in-lieu thereof .... ." Id. at 189.
142. Washington State Statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020, required only that the
exaction requirement be "reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed
development. . ." 877 P.2d at 192.
143. Trimen, 877 P.2d at 194. Ironically, the Washington Supreme Court applied the
"reasonably necessary" standard but cited Dolan, specifically noting its requirement of
"rough proportionality" between required dedications and the impact of the proposed
development. Id. The Dolan Court expressly rejected the "reasonable relationship"
standard. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis in
Dolan).
144. 875 P.2d 1310 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
145. Id. In Home Builders, a group of developers brought an action challenging the
validity a city ordinance imposing a water resource development fee on new developments.
Id. at 1311. The developers claimed "that the fee did not offset costs associated with
providing necessary public services to the developments, that the fee did not result in a
beneficial use to the developments, that the fee did not bear a reasonable relationship to
any burden imposed upon [the city], and that the fee discriminated against new
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must be "reasonably related""4 to the burden placed on the community
by the proposed development.147 Furthermore, the court appeared to
revive judicial deference analysis, which Dolan expressly rejected.4
Specifically, the court noted that it should "acquiesce in the legislative
determination of all matters of fact unless [they are] clearly erroneous,
arbitrary and wholly unwarranted."' 149
Lastly, in R.R. Hensler v. City of Glendale,50 the Supreme Court
of California avoided the Dolan holding altogether. A city ordinance
precluded Hensler from developing forty percent of his property.'
Hensler sued, claiming that the regulation amounted to a taking of his
property by inverse condemnation.' The court held that the
landowner was not entitled to judicial review of his constitutional claim
because he failed to pursue an administrative remedy within the statutory
limitation period.'
CONCLUSION
Property owners are better off now than they were before Dolan.
homebuilders and new residents." Id.
146. An Arizona statute, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.05 (Supp. 1994), requires
that development fees must bear a "reasonable relationship" to the burden of the proposed
development. 875 P.2d at 1312.
147. Because the trial court had not decided whether the development fee bore a
reasonable relationship to the burden placed on the city, the appellate court remanded for
consideration of this issue. Id. at 1318. Interestingly, both the majority and dissent
discussed the various relational tests adopted by different courts to evaluate development
fees, but neither mentioned Dolan or its rough proportionality standard. Id. at 1313-25.
148. See supra notes 85-46 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
express rejection of judicial deference analysis in evaluating development exactions).
149. Homebuilders, 875 P.2d at 1312 (citation omitted). The court further declared
that the municipality need only show "some rational basis" for the amount of the fee in
order to avoid it being "clearly erroneous, arbitrary and wholly unwarranted." Id. at 1315.
150. 876 P.2d 1043 (Cal. 1994) (en banc); see also Waters Landing Limited
Partnership v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) (holding Dolan
inapplicable in the context of special development tax assessments).
151. Id. at 1047. The ordinance, enacted three years after the owner purchased the
property, prohibited construction on major ridge lines within the city. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1060. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66499.37 (West 1983) requires that any action
challenging acts or decisions made pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act shall be
commenced within ninety days after the date of such decision. 876 P.2d at 1059.
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Dolan's "rough proportionality" requirement should prevent egregious
violations of constitutional property rights. In addition, by placing the
burden of proof on the municipality the Court reduced the steepness of
a property owner's uphill struggle against excessive exactions. However,
Dolan offers only limited protection. Because of the delays, costs, and
risks of judicial appeal, developers may have little choice but to succumb
to local governments' demands. Moreover, as the post-Dolan decisions
suggest, state courts may avoid strict application of the Supreme Court's
new standard. For these reasons, Dolan offers property owners
considerably less than a complete victory.
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